

Recruitment, Mobiliza- tion and Concentration

Course In Organization and Tactics.

Lecture No. 12,

BY CAPTAIN H. B. FERGUSON,

Corps of Engineers.

Dec. 9, 1904.

**Department Military Art,
Infantry & Cavalry School.**

Recruitment, Mobilization and Concentration.

LECTURE NO. 12.

The creation of a miobile army, concentrated near the actual theatre of war, involves many questions. Some 'of these questions are military, but some are political and range from the national policy to preferential appointment and individual influence.

In this country the civil authority is supreme, the natural result is that on the military rests the burden of proof as to the desirability, wisdom, or,necessity of all military legislation or policy. An efficient military'policy depends on the co-operation of the civil and the military authorities. It is essential to the solution of this progressive problem that those fundamental questions governing subsequent questions be decided in the logical order in which they arise.

While each nation must' work out its own answer to many of these questions, some of them have arisen and have been answered in the history of other nations. Ghengis Khan had a general staff, Tamarlane used a cavalry screen. Parrot-like imitation in a man or nation is rarely successful, but the study of policies and results in other nations in order to determine principles or methods that are independent of the national character, should lead to profit. Some one has said of China that "She has contributed something to every other civilization on earth and had borrowed from none, hence her sleep of centuries, ignorant of her weakness and of her strength."

RECRUITMENT.

The two general methods of securing individuals for an army are by conscription and by voluntary enlistment. As the fundamental law governing enlistment determines to a great extent all the subsequent policy and details of mobilization as well as recruiting, the present practice in Germany, France, Switzerland and Great Britain will be considered as giving examples of universal conscription in a monarchy of the same in a republic, of universal compulsory training in a Federation, and of voluntary enlistment in a liberal monarchy.

GERMANY.—In what is now Germany the status of a soldier has fluctuated between that of an outlaw and that of an autocrat; at one time, private rights, and at another, national security has been the ruling factor. A standing army of long term service, was maintained up to the battle of Jena. During continuous war and under the genius of Frederick the Great the results mark an epoch in the Military Art. During the following peace it is argued, and with apparent reason, that the attendant evils of long term service were great and, inevitable ; increase of regulations to the checking of initiative thought and action, the minimized tasks of subordinate officers, idleness, and the intense hatred of the common people. Then comes the defeat of Jena and the tyranny of the French occupation, which drove the Prussian people to see their only security in their own army, and with the provision of Napoleon's treaty limiting the standing Prussian Army to 40,000, resulted in the beginning of the present Prussian System of conscription. Willing conscript recruits were hurried through the standing army, being given only the simplest essential rudiments of training, but even in his day Napoleon saw his oppression defeated by the growth of an army whose moral and numbers were evidenced at Leipsic and Waterloo.

The Prussian system of conscription is now enforced

in all the continental nations of Europe and in Turkey and Japan.

“Liability to Military Service.—Under the present law of the Empire every male German, unless he be a member of a reigning or mediatized house, is liable to enrollment in the military service. This liability, which can not be satisfied by a substitute, and from which persons convicted of crime are excluded, begins with the completed 20th and ends with the completed 45th year. It is divided into the liability to service in (1) the army or navy, and (2) the landstrum. The former, embracing, as a rule, the period from the completed 20th year of the subject ‘to March **31** of the year in which he completes his 39th year, is again divided into liability to serve as follows:

- (1) The active army. Service in the standing army.
- (2) The reserve.
- (3) Landwehr.
- (4)** Ersatz reserve.

“Persons belonging to either of the three last-mentioned classes, except such as form the lanwehr of the second levy, constitute, when not with the colors, the so-called “furloughed state,” During peace they are assembled once or twice a year for muster, and are required to report each change in their address to the commanding officer of the district in which they reside.

“Service in the Standing Army occupies seven years, of which three years (mostly from the completed 20th to the completed 23rd year) are generally spent with the colors, and four years (mostly to the completed 27th year) in the reserve.

“Men of the reserve may be subjected to two trainings of eight weeks each, and required to join their companies for this purpose. In war the reserve reenforces the active army.

“*The Landwehr* is divided into two levies. The liability to service in the first lasts five years, and, as a rule, embraces the period from the 27th to the 32d year. In the second levy it continues to March 31 of the year in which the man completes his 39th year. Landwehr men of the first levy join a regiment of the active army within the district of their residence for one week’s training during each of two years of their term. In war the landwehr (Infantry and cavalry) is either formed into separate organizations or merged into ersatz organizations, which supply vacancies in the field army.

“*The Ersatz Reserve* consists of persons who, though qualified- (or but slightly disqualified) for the military service, have not been-being supernumerary or for some other reason—enrolled in the standing army. The liability to service in the ersatz reserve lasts twelve years, beginning with October 1 of the year in which the 20th year is completed.. Of the ersatz reservists only a part are during peace subjected to a brief training on three separate occasions not exceeding twenty weeks in a-11, and these-enter the landwehr of the second levy on the expiration of their term. All the others are passed to the landsturm of the first levy. On mobilization the men of the ersatz reserve join “ersatz” or depot organizations. The seven junior annual contingents of the ersatz reserve are supposed to contain a sufficient number of men to bring the standing army to a war footing.

“*The Landsturm* consists of all persons liable to military service between the ages of 17 and 45 years who are not enrolled in the army or navy. It is divided into two levies—the first, comprising all such persons up to March 31 of the year in which they complete their 39th year, and the second all the remainder. In peace the landsturm is not subjected to a muster or training of any kind. It is not, in fact, a constituent part of the army proper, but when called forth for the defense of the country during war, as it may be by the Emperor, or in case of exigency by a commanding general, or the “Gouverneur” of a fortress, its members are

required to wear a distinctive badge, recognizable at a distance, to bring them within the international definition of lawful combatants.

“Exceptions.—The law authorizes some exceptions to the above rules, which are based upon a desire to avoid interference with scientific, artistic, and industrial training, or to prevent undue hardship, such as would result if -a youth upon whom others depend for support, or for the conduct of an important business, were drafted into the military service. Young men coming up to a certain educational, professional, or technical standard, who have the means of uniforming, equipping, and subsisting themselves, may join a regiment of their choice between their 17th and 20th years, and are furloughed to the reserve after but one year’s service with the colors. In passing, it may be pointed out that it is from this class of “one year volunteers” that the bulk of the reserve and landwehr officers are drawn. In other cases, notably of persons of insufficient bodily development, or whose training in a particular art or industry can not be interrupted without detriment, enrollment in the active army is deferred for from one to five years, generally for only one year at a time. On the other hand, service with the colors may be prolonged in the following cases :

(1) , Pupils of military educational institutes are obliged to serve longer than the regular term with the colors.

(2) Noncommissioned officers and soldiers who wish to serve beyond the established-term may reenlist-as a rule for one year at a time—if their commanding officer wants to retain, them.

(3) Periods of confinement exceeding six weeks are not counted as service.

“The above rules respecting liability to military service apply to a state of peace. In time of war men are not passed

from the standing army to the landwhehr, nor from the latter to the landsturm.”*

* * *

The Colonial army is made up by voluntary transfer from the home army. -

The average budget for the past ten years gives \$₁ 17,000,000, the effective strength being 492,000 in 1891, and 604,000 in 1903, or about \$₂₁₀ per man per year.

FRANCE.—The history of conscription in France emphasizes its possibilities as to time and numbers, its absolute dependence on the national will created in part by its enforcement, its evils due to substitution, its impotency without a loyal and intelligent staff.

Under Jourdan's plan of conscription, made law in 1778, the contingent was to be chosen by ballot from all Frenchmen between twenty and twenty-one years of age. The right of substitution was allowed. Recruits were sent to the front in small bodies and were soon whipped into shape. The fighting efficiency of the army through Austerlitz and Friedland is well known. Owing to lax discipline in 1805 and the severe winter of 1806-7, desertion became very common. This evil increased until (1811) all deserters or others liable to service were treated as outlaws and hunted down by 40,000 trained troops scattered over France.

The conscription was extended to all territory of French occupation in 1807. In 1812, the National Guard of France was organized. It was divided into three classes; "the ages being 20 to 25, 25 to 40 and 40 to 60. The liability, under the law, was to service in France. This law was honored until 1813.

Six hundred and nineteen thousand men is the number given as the total of those engaged in connection with the

* From "Organization of Germany Army," by General Schwan, U. S. A.

Russian campaign, only 240,000 of these were Frenchmen. At this time the other armies in Italy, Spain and France aggregated 500,000 men, all making a grand total of 1, 120,000 men under Napoleon's command, 40,000 of these were hunting deserters.

The raising of the army of 1813 illustrates more forcibly still the possibilities of conscription under the genius of Napoleon. On Feb. 1, 1813, the returns of the Grand Army showed 6,400 men. These with the Berlin garrison of 16,000 were the nucleus, the National Guard was the chief source of supply, 170,000 men organized and armed on the 1st of March, and 600,000 on the last of May were the results. Of the 300,000 of these dispatched to Germany only half arrived ; the administrative departments were corrupt, the spirit of the nation was broken.

The treaty of 1814 set free the French garrisons in Germany and also many prisoners. Conscription could not be enforced as formerly and it was practically a volunteer army that fought Waterloo.

Jourdan's policy with varying exemptions, remained in force until 1870. The reaction following Napoleon's wars was very marked, the ruthless enforcement of conscription for service out of France had made the people loath the army, all who could afford it, bought substitutes. The result was that in the army there were many old soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and officers promoted from the ranks whose conduct in 1870 won Von Moltke's praise. The other "junior officers did not seem to devote their entire time and abilities to their profession."

Such an army was suitable for carrying on the small foreign wars in Africa, but again we see the inherent evils of long peace service, in inefficient junior officers and increased hatred of the people. However, the chief causes of defeat in 1870 must be sought in the centralization of staff duties, isolation of the staff, incompetent staff officers and* the conse-

quent lack of proper preparation for mobilization and supply.

The present law of France (1901) requires compulsory service. There are the usual exemptions. No substitution is allowed. The terms of service are two years in the active army, eleven years in the reserve of the active army, six years in the territorial army and six years in the reserve of the territorial army. The Colonial army is raised by voluntary enlistment and is liable to service anywhere, though most of it is ordinarily stationed in France.

The average budget for ten years gives \$120,000,000, the effective strength being slightly under 600,000 men, or \$200 per man per year.

SWITZERLAND.—The Swiss Confederation since 1874, has made military training obligatory upon its citizens. Every Swiss citizen becomes liable to military service on reaching the age of 20. During his 21st year the recruit is called out for from 45 to 80 days according to the arm of service to which he is assigned. Then he is posted to the active army, in which he remains for 11 or 12 years, being called out in every alternate year for a repetition course of from 16 to 18 days. He is then listed in the reserves, all men of which, except those especially excused are called out in their own district for 4 to 6 days once in 4 years. All reserves are held to inspection one day each year and may be ordered out for special exercise in case a mobilization is likely to occur. Each man keeps his own gun (issued to him) during the entire term of his liability, except, in case of his prolonged absence or neglect, the Canton must procure and store his gun.

Officers.—The Swiss army is officered mainly by men not entirely withdrawn from civil life, only the officers with the 5,000 permanent fortress troops and the 130 instructors are professional soldiers. A candidate for a commission, must in his first year pass through the recruit's course of 45 to 80 days in the ranks, followed by a 16 days repetition course. In his second year he attends noncommissioned

officers school for **28** days. In his third year, he attends as a non-commissioned officer a recruits course of 53 days, then a repetition course of 16 days, and an officers preparatory course of **42** days. In his fourth year he attends a special musketry course of 53 days as an officer. (Seventy days per year for four years.) Further courses in subsequent years are necessary before he can be promoted to first lieutenant and still further before he can become a captain. No officer can be promoted unless he has a certificate of capacity from his instructor and commanding officer. For the higher commands and staff duty, selection, is made by a commission governed by above rule, and various requirements as to previous service. In general the Cantons name officers of the line up to and including commanders of battalions (1,100 men.), squadrons (100 men) and batteries. All other officers are named by the general government. Any officer can be retired for incapacity on application of his Division commander. Instructors are to be assigned to command only in case of war.

All children above ten and below twenty years old whether in school or not are required to take the military gymnastic training under the teacher who has taken the course under an instructor. The last two years (from **18** to **20**) are usually devoted to target practice.

. Shooting clubs, conforming to the rules established, receive assistance from the government. Company and non-commissioned officers of infantry are required to take target practice each year as may be specified in orders.

The central government is responsible for organization, equipment (except personal) and transport, arms and ammunition. It raises an officers all special or technical troops, such as: scouts, engineer and medical troops, transport and ammunition columns, and artificers. It appoints all staff officers above battalion staff, (except in one case) and all line officers above battalion, squadron and battery commanders.

The Cantons furnish all battalions, squadrons and batteries and appoint their officers. Subject to special inspection, the commanding officers of these units inspect and report, each on his own command.

Administration is by army division districts, each under a colonel. The districts are established for peace and war. The equipment for each division is stored in the division. In war a General-in-Chief is selected by the Council and is given practically supreme authority.

The Swiss budget for 1902 gives some 234,000 armed men and about the same number of aid troops. The expenditure was \$7,000,000. Our attache reported that their maneuvers of some 30,000 men were carried out very creditably. He compliments the Staff and thinks that the time of training is too short.

GREAT BRITAIN,—Because of her supremacy at sea, her great wealth; and the necessity of service in the colonies. Great Britain maintains her military forces by voluntary enlistment. Due to lack of preparation, and to the methods of training and selecting officers, men and money have sometimes been lavishly wasted. The spirit of the individual soldier has always been excellent. The old noncommissioned officers are perhaps unequalled.

The present forces consist of the Regular Army, the Militia, the -Volunteers and the Yeomanry.

The term of service in the Regular Army is, with a few exceptions, three years in the active army, and nine years in the reserves. These reservists receive twelve cents a day and are liable to be called out for service at home or abroad. The failure to restrict service abroad to large wars made it very difficult for these men to get employment and led to drinking, loafing and the discredit of recruiting. Conditions are now somewhat improved. The government employs part of these men, keeps lists of the others and seeks to aid them in finding work..

The Militia is held primarily for duty at home but is liable to service abroad. It consists of infantry, artillery and engineers. The enlistment is for six years. The recruits receive six months training in their regimental depot and twenty-eight days a year with their corps when called out, being paid regular army pay.

The Yeomanry are mounted Volunteers with noblemen as officers. The enlistment is for three years. The Volunteers correspond approximately to our Militia and are for 'service in the United Kingdom. They have been practically self-supporting but receive a small allowance per capita of those showing a certain attendance or "proficiency."

For a thorough study of the British Militia and Volunteers you are referred to the report of the Royal Commission on the South African war from which a few points will be quoted. "The Militia is unfit to take the field." "The causes are beyond the control of its officers and men." "Time of training is too short." "The Commanding officers of battalions and a small staff of company officers should form a part of the permanent establishment."

"The volunteers are not qualified to take the field against a regular army, this is in no way attributable to them." "The Volunteer force could be much improved without shifting the foundation on which it is built." "The governing condition is that the Volunteer earns his own living." "He should not be put to any expense on account of his service."

"The evidence shows beyond doubt that the all important question concerning the volunteer force is that of the qualification of its officers." "Tactical schools should be formed and Volunteer officers encouraged to attend them and other schools of instruction by elastic conditions as to time and place and by sufficient money allowances to cover all necessary expenses." That some regular officers sent to instruct or command volunteers did more harm than good

was brought out in the evidence. The general rule was that the commanding officer and adjutant of volunteers should at first be trained officers. As Volunteer officers came to the front they were given command, a regular officer being kept as adjutant. Colonial troops as a rule kept their own officers.

“The force should be organized into brigades and divisions, commanders and staff should be appointed. These commanders should hold no other appointments and should be responsible for the training, instruction and inspection of the bodies under their command and for their mobilization and leading in war.”

Proper financial aid should be given.

“The training of the Volunteer force should be concentrated upon what is essential for its tasks in war.

Corps told off for special duties in war should, during peace practice those duties.”

“The Volunteer force has had a great effect in educating the people of Great Britain to think of the army as a national institution, and at the same time it has enlarged the ideas of professional soldiers on the subject of the means and methods of military training. We deprecate any change that would modify this spirit, except as part of some comprehensive measure which would replace both the Militia and Volunteer forces by an organization which, while giving greater military efficiency and at least equal numbers, would also render permanent that sympathy between the nation and the army which before the rise of the modern Volunteer force was undoubtedly defective?

UNITED STATES.—Civil War. We can find in our own history both warning and example. You are referred to General Upton’s “Military policy of the United States.” Short term enlistment at the beginning of war, state appointment of officers of volunteers, and failure to use officers of

the regular army are among factors that are logically charged with extravagant waste of money and lives to the hazard of national existence.

General Sherman writes as follows concerning the Civil War :*—"But the real difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an adequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every system known to modern nations, all with more or less success--voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes--and I think all officers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute. When a regiment is once organized in a state, and mustered into the service of the United States, the officers and men become subject to the same laws of discipline and government as the regular troops, They are in no sense "militia," but compose a part of the army of the United States, only retain their state title for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited from the neighborhood of their original organization. Once organized the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes difficult to obtain recruits the pay should be raised by congress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties. I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldiers to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promise of three hundred or even six hundred dollars in the form of bounty."

"The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancy among the officers filled from the best non-commissioned and men, the habit was to raise new regiments with new colonels,

*Memoirs, p. 386-88.

captains and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations.”

“The fact that soldiers would like to have a good fellow for their captain is the best reason why he should be appointed by the colonel, or by some superior authority, instead of being elected by the men,” “The President-should exercise the power of appointment—of officers of volunteers as well as of regulars.” The Regular army and the Military Academy have in the past provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an ample supply of good officers for future wars ; but, should their numbers be insufficient, we can always rely on the great number of young men of education and force of character throughout the country to supplement them.”

General.-It must be recognized that there is great chance of error in all generalization. In wars waged for personal grievances or for conquest against an unprepared nation, comparatively small armies of professional soldiers of long service have been successful. The evils of long term peace service have been seen in Prussia, in France (due to substitution) and in England. It is difficult to see how these evils can be escaped ; they are, to repeat, inefficient junior officers, the isolation of the army and the indifference or even hatred of the people; the gain being an excellent body of noncommissioned officers; In wars involving the existence of the state both sides have at last resorted to conscription. The fighting spirit of the individual in a volunteer army is usually conceded to be superior to that of the individual in a conscript army-and with sufficient training a volunteer army, man for man, should be superior. When the whole nation is finally under arms this factor cannot enter. The national character, proximity and strength of probable enemies must govern largely the methods adopted. It is now generally assumed as an operative axiom that any nation whose security depends on the prompt

efficiency of the army alone, must adopt conscription, and that only a nation secured against immediate danger by a navy, as is Great Britain., or by distance, as is the United States can rely on voluntary enlistment. There are, however, strong opinions to the contrary. Count Sternberg of Austria, in discussing the change in tactics due to modern weapons says, "The Nation in Arms" is a suicidal institution unless one shifts out the bad element, which takes up as much room and eats as much as the good. It is better to have 1,000,000 expensive soldiers who are worth something than 3,000,000 who are worth nothing." General Upton argues that as conscription is almost sure to be the last step it should be the first in a war for national existence.

The value of numbers and training is seen in all wars, the relative importance of each is the question to be solved, that is, for a given output, will an army capable of doing the work to be done be had by distributing a little training among many men. or highly training a small army. The small army allows more careful selection of material. Under the assumption that the work to be done is not identical for the total forces to be used, the answer must be a compromise. The question is still capable of a solution which must depend on a fixed agreement as to the duties under any and -all assumptions as to the national dangers. The actual fighting force of a field army or the number of highly trained men required, is only about half of the entire army, after the line of supply is about 500 miles long in hostile territory.

Under the Constitution and the laws of Congress the Military forces of the United States consist of the Regular Army, the Militia, and Volunteers during war.

The Regular Army should serve as a model for all other troops to be raised and above all should educate officers. The plans for its mobilization should form the basis for the mobilization of all other troops. Its actual independent use

in war must, by its small numbers, be limited to operations where those numbers, to use Napoleon's formula, multiplied by their velocity, will be greater than the resistance met. Whether with its line of supply guarded, such is true against Canada, Mexico, the states of South America, or in the securing of a base, against foreign powers in any of these countries, is the issue.

In a war directly involving the existence of the state, the Regular Army must be accompanied on the first line by other troops ; it is reasonable to suppose that trained officers should be distributed through the whole army. General Grant says that in case of war the regular army should be disbanded, and all officers distributed among new troops. Such a statement from such an authority deserves serious consideration,

The greatest practicable efficiency in a modern army, as well as the development of the total military strength of a nation when necessity may arise, demands recognition of certain conditions. The duties of a private soldier now require more intelligence and initiative than ever before. Training cannot create these qualities. The work of junior officers should develop and utilize the best capabilities of the individual. The interests of the army and of the entire people should be the same in peace; they must be so in war. The basis of this identity are respect, sympathy and education. The occupation of a private soldier should be rated by his government at least as high as low grade skilled labor. Money must be the chief basis of all voluntary service, except in times of imminent danger. To the pay and allowances received during service can be added any increased capacity to earn money after discharge. Honorable discharge should be a certificate of character and some degree of ability. A certain amount of sound military education distributed throughout a country keeps the people interested in the army and is a great element of strength in case of war, as,

undoubtedly, also are those men who have been trained in the army, whether they are listed as reserves and help form a nucleus, or by volunteering, are distributed through the whole force. All these conditions applied to our country point toward a carefully selected standing, volunteer army of short term peace service ; one or, at most, two years, with supplemental target practice, the noncommissioned officers and 10 per cent of the privates being kept twice this term,, but not indefinitely. The proposition of getting men able to meet such conditions is similar to that of carrying on any important work requiring intelligent men ; the men must be paid. We can afford it.*

The fact that 99 percent of all reservists in Great Britain rejoined for the South African war is worth mentioning.

The necessity of trained officers in war would suggest that all detached officers (about 470) in peace be on an extra list. This list could well be increased by sending carefully selected officers to instruct the officers of the militia at times convenient to the latter.

The history of our militia during the war of 1812, the Mexican, Civil and Spanish wars encourages no great reliance in it ; how much of this inefficiency has been due to neglect by the general government, and how much to inherent faults of the system will always be disputed. All agree that the individual men have not been to blame. The practice of electing junior officers, the governor's power to promote officers in war when they are not under his command and he cannot know their relative abilities, are potent faults. The necessity of regimental organization and the value or even existence of regimental esprit de corps is not evident except in the larger cities. The Swiss as well as the British method has been noted.

* Pension of 1903—\$141,752,870.50.

The general plan must utilize the organization and training of the militia, but there are many men who, in peace, lack time or inclination to serve in the militia but who would be desirable volunteers in war. A comprehensive system of target practice, in which men in the militia and out of it and boys in military and other schools are encouraged to shoot, would soon furnish plenty of material half made into an army. (W. D. Cir. 29. 1904.)

MOBILIZATION.

Mobilization is the transformation of the military establishment from the status of peace to that of war. The mobilization, therefore, of a unit means its completion for war in 'men, material, and transportation. The method of recruitment being decided, and the size and composition of the final army and its accessories being known, the intermediate problem, or mobilization, is absolutely definite and consists in handling men and material. The problem must be worked out on accepted business principles ; time, thought and money spent in making. and perfecting plans and in completing preliminary arrangements, mean time gained in final execution. Improvements in the means of transportation have greatly increased the relative value of time during the period of mobilization.

. *GERMANY*.—With their complete system of conscription as a definite basis, the details of the German mobilization could be thoroughly worked out during peace. The following is taken from the chapter on Mobilization in *Strategy*, by Col. Fiebeger :

“The general plan of mobilization is drawn up and annually corrected by the General Staff, and is based on the principle . of decentralization. ; -each corps, division, brigade, and regiment must complete its own mobilization. Each army corps commander has personal charge of the mobilization of his corps, and is assisted by the highest civil authorities in his district. To localize his work the country is divided into as

many army corps, districts as there are corps less one ; each corps except the Guard Corps is recruited from its own. district, the Guard is recruited from the entire. Empire. Each corps commander being informed of the required strength of field corps, depot, reserve, and garrison troops upon a war footing, prepares a scheme for their mobilization, based upon the needs of his corps, the resources of his district, and the instructions given him of the use which he may make the rail-ways. This scheme is based upon the mobilization in order., of the active army, depot troops, reserves, and garrison troops. It indicates the particular branch to which every officer is to be detailed, and the particular branch to which every annual class of the active army, reserves and landwehr is to be assigned. As a rule the youngest men who have completed a full term of service are assigned to the field army, the next classes to the reserves, and the oldest to the garrison troops. Depot troops are formed of the partially trained recruits and young men of the ersatz reserve. The officers in charge of divisions, brigades, and regiments of infantry, of brigades of artillery, of battalions of rifles and train, of the corps of engineers, of the corps of intence, of artillery depots, etc., are required to prepare plans for the mobilization for their respective units and branches.”

“Each army corps district is as a rule divided into four brigade districts, and these are subdivided into four landwehr battalion districts of two landwehr company districts each. The commander of a landwehr battalion district is an officer on the retired list whose duty is to keep full and accurate lists of the men in his district who are on -furlough from the regular army, or belong to the reserves or landwehr. The annual class, place of residence, and organization in which he served, is inserted after the name of each man of the standing army, reserve, and landwehr, and the service for which he is especially fitted by trade or occupation after the name of each man in the ersatz reserve. To assist in prepar-

ing these lists the commander is allowed a small staff. It is his duty also to notify the individual men. when the order for mobilization is issued and inform them when and where to report. In order that this notification can be given in the shortest possible time, he must plan. the routes to be followed by the orderlies and others in summoning the men; he must also plan the routes to be followed by the men in reaching the rendezvous fixed in advance, where they are to be received by officers and noncommissioned officers of the active army, reserves, and landwehr, sent to receive them. In notifying the men, the district commander is assisted by the civil authorities. The responsibility. of the district commander ceases when the men have been received at the general rendezvous of the district. In marching to the rendezvous the men are usually collected in small squads, and led by a squad leader appointed by the district commander.”

“Upon the arrival of the men at their regimental headquarters, they are clothed, equipped, and armed, from the regimental stores collected for the purpose in times of peace, and are then as far as possible assigned to the companies in which they are to serve their tour of active duty.”

“While the field army is being thus mobilized, its depot troops are being formed. The mobilization of the reserve and garrison troops takes place immediately after that of the field army. In order that the mobilization. may take place without confusion, the first day of mobilization in each army corps district is fixed by a telegram from the War Ministry. Each officer concerned in the operation must prepare in time of peace, a journal giving in order his proposed actions on each day of the mobilization period, and these journals, after approval by his superiors, must be strictly followed.”

“To secure the necessary horses, the country is divided into horse district. In each district the horses are annually examined and their value appraised. At the outbreak of

war, every owner of a horse must present it at a certain rendezvous for inspection and possible- acceptance by the government at the price fixed.”

Results.—July 16th, 1870, three days before war was declared, was the first day of mobilization. On the ninth day, or July 24th, about 500,000 men were mobilized and the transportation of the field army to the front was begun.

“While the field army/ was being mobilized, the depot troops were being formed. Each infantry regiment formed a depot battalion, each cavalry regiment a ‘depot squadron, and each regiment of artillery a depot battalion ; the other services also organized their depot units. The depot troops were, as a rule, composed of partially instructed recruits and *ersatz* reserve men. The reserve and garrison troops were formed of the extra reserve and landwehr men; the youngest classes were assigned to reserve battalions, and the oldest to the garrison troops. The number of extra men of the reserve and first contingent of the landwehr furnishes about two battalions of reserve troops for every regiment of the field army.” Strategy.-Fiebeger.

Great *Britain, South Africa.*—The mobilization section in the British Army was established in 1886. It was directly under the Commander in Chief in 1898 and the permanent plan had been completed by this date. The plan called for 85,000 men and material ready for transportation over sea. The horses for all wagons were not kept on hand. Alterations in plan with special reference to South Africa, as to clothing and wagons, were begun during August, 1899. Army Service Corps troops were embarked during September, 1899. The telegraphic order for mobilization was issued October 7th, 1899, embarkation began October 20th. On November 17th, 41,000 men had been embarked. Ninety-nine per cent of the reservists obeyed the summons. By April 18th, 1900, all the Regular Army had been embarked and Volunteers and Militia to make a total of about 180,000.

During the war 448,435 men were sent, 250,000 being maintained in the field at one time.

United States, War with Spain.—At the outbreak of the war with Spain, in 1898, the Regular Army of the United States numbered about 28,000. The procedure was about the same as in all previous wars, or to quote General Upton, "Instead of mobilization we have legislation." War was declared April 23rd. Pursuant to several acts of Congress the Regular Army was recruited to 58,000 and volunteers to the number of 216,000 were raised by August 3 1st. Most of the volunteers were furnished by the states, the officers, up to and including colonels, were appointed by the governors, it was specified that not more than one regular officer could be appointed in one regiment. The officers of the Staff Departments were appointed by the President. The officers of 16,000 special volunteer troops, infantry, cavalry and engineers were appointed by the President. As in the Civil War, the volunteers were, as soon as possible, concentrated in large camps -of instruction, one or two corps in each camp. The Militia as such was not ordered out. Some organizations volunteered bodily. War was declared April 23rd. Orders as to transportation allowances and company property were issued May 25th. An order concerning equipment allowances for volunteers was issued June 10th. It is hard to forget the chaotic confusion during this so-called Emergency. The training of these volunteer troops, their health and probably efficiency are questions that do not enter to any very great degree into the problem of mobilization, equipment and concentration. The results as to numbers and time do not compare with the German mobilization of 1870, but they do show the magnitude of the task and that it is impossible for any amount of brains, money and energy to accomplish that task expeditiously unless the general policy is known and definite plans and preparations are made before the task is actually- begun.

Plan of Mobilization.—Under our organization the general plan of mobilization would be made by the General Staff. The determination of the source of personnel is the only indefinite question, that is, the only one in which politics must enter ; this uncertainty does not affect the other questions of units, equipment and material. The extent of the actual preparations during peace, requiring purchase of material, etc., depends of course on the appropriations of Congress. The present law* authorizes the President to recruit the Regular Army to 100,000 men, and to call forth the Militia for nine months service within the territory of the United States.

The attempts to recruit the Regular Army when Volunteer and Militia troops were being raised were not entirely successful in 1861 and in 1898. Without some definite method of recruitment, reserves or enlisted volunteers, the value of having a different peace and war strength is not evident. The plans for mobilizing the Regular Army should form the basis for the mobilization of all other troops. Its actual mobilization presents no difficulties except the appreciation of the fact that any unit that is not ready to take the field on forty-eight hours notice should be made ready or should be disbanded. The limitations of the law preclude the Militia, as such, from any plan for operations except against an invasion by sea that must be presumed to be defeated within nine months. Whether or not the probabilities of these circumstances make this the general case or create the necessity for two distinct plans for mobilization must be decided as must also the safety of a plan based on the probability of the organized militia volunteering bodily. The centralization of policy and the decentralization of administration is the aim of both the German and British systems. It would seem that the relation of our states to the United States could be used to help carry out this idea, and that the

* G. O. 7 W. D. 1904, and G. O. 30 W. D. 1898.

well-founded jealousy against one man's controlling a large, idle army in peace should still be carefully guarded without making it impossible to develop our military strength in time to prevent disaster.

If the decisions on the above points require a plan to be made that does not include the Militia, as such, it would seem possible to form complete local paper battalions of men who would sign an agreement to volunteer to serve anywhere under, the conditions agreed upon. Where possible these battalions would be identical with the present militia battalions. The regiments might be the same also where a board of regular and militia officers of recognized ability and judgment certify the proficiency of the Colonel and the Adjutant. Justice, reason, history and experience are united in demanding that the bravery and willingness of the men in ranks should not be nullified by officers whose abilities are not beyond question. If the colonel or adjutant could not pass the above test a regular officer, most carefully selected, should be listed in his stead. When any of the majors passed the required test the regimental formation could be resumed in peace. The great advantage of having a regular officer for adjutant at all times deserves consideration.

To fill up any shortage in these militia units and to form new units, lists could be kept at the various target ranges of all men who can shoot and agree to volunteer, a man who cannot shoot is scarcely worth listing. Lists could be made of men whose abilities and character make them desirable as volunteer officers. This should not be difficult; every profession throughout the country has a way of finding out the standing of any man with whom it may be necessary to deal. Besides determining the source of the personnel, the general plan defines the various units and fixes the numbers and composition of the field army, coast defense troops, garrison troops, and reserves, and decides all general questions of material, equipment and places of assembly.

The lists of special equipment for each unit would be

prepared by the proper departments and submitted as part of the detailed plans, the lists of all other equipment, including the equipment of all headquarters above those of the regiments and all personal equipment of officers, would be made by the General Staff.

The rating of regular officers and specific assignment to various staffs and commands is in the province of our General Staff.

The question of transportation of units or individuals presenting telegram or signed forms could probably be settled with all railroads by general agreement and contract as in the Civil War.

Supply of horses and mules on mobilization and during the war is in itself an enormous task. The total number of animals shipped for South Africa was 434,527, of which 417,337* arrived.

The difficulty of obtaining horses is at present the weak point in the German preparation.

The work of making the detailed plans and keeping them up to date must be distributed. The importance of this work and the clear lines along which it divides itself have made the following authorities co-ordinate, each responsible only to the Chief of Staff. 1.—The Division Commanders. 2.—The Chiefs of the Staff Departments. The British board declares with great emphasis that the District Commander charged with mobilizing all troops should be unhampered by all questions of training. All officers, including those retired, on duty with Militia 'troops are directly under our Division Commanders who, by virtue of the law requiring inspection and rating of all Militia as to its preparation to take the field, can cause to be submitted detailed plans for the mobilization of each unit. These plans will be based on the general plan. and instructions, and must be re-

* M. I, D. Notes 1902.

viewed, those of skeleton units must be completed,—corrected and perfected.

The complete equipment and war material for the forces of the district would be supplied by the proper bureaus of the War Department and stored in the district, contracts for transportation and the like would be made to be executed within a specified time after telegraphic notice. The complete plans for the whole district will be sent to the General Staff and when finally approved will be reviewed at stated times and all deficiencies made good.

The division office would continue during war and have general charge of recruiting reserves. The British regulations allow 10 per cent for the first re-enforcements. In their mobilization plans they figure that 10 per cent of peace establishments cannot take the field and that 10 per cent of the reservists will not rejoin.

The Chief of each Staff Department and Corps would submit plans for the preparation and mobilization of his department, these plans would include; the equipment lists of the various units and depots ; standing contracts for all material and supplies not kept on hand ; lists of individuals to form the complete personnel of special troops and civil employees the department will need under the general plan—use could be made of the Civil Service lists. Railroad employees, telegraph operators, hospital attendants, lumbermen and mechanics, throughout the country could be listed. The work might be done by sending officers direct from Washington or chiefly by the various staff officers of the district commanders, who could also be responsible for the storing of the equipment and material sent to the district.

A complete plan of mobilization and concentration should determine the personnel and material of the final army and the exact route and schedule of each man and of each item from his or its position during peace to his or its proper

position in the final army. Time, thought and 'money will be necessary to perfect such a plan. The general distribution of telephone and telegraph lines will simplify the actual execution.

CONCENTRATION.

After the units of the field army are mobilized the next operation is the concentration of the field army near the frontier. During mobilization, the constantly increasing units must be transported, recruited and furnished with clothing, arms and equipment ; concentration is the handling of definite and complete units.

The British designate as "Places of Assembly" those places at which mobilized units are assembled to form brigades, divisions, and army corps ; and as "War Stations" the places to which units are primarily allotted for service under the scheme for home defense. The war stations may, in certain circumstances, also, be the Places of Assembly. This assembling of units at "Places of Assembly" is concentration, except so far as the equipment and organization of the various headquarters is concerned. It also makes it possible to supply any deficiencies in the equipment . of any unit. Such deficiencies are sure to exist unless all previous arrangements are practically perfect. In supplying these deficiencies after very large bodies of troops have been collected, confusion is very liable to occur.

The mobilization of each unit of the field. army should be completed before the transportation of this unit to the frontier is begun. When railroad facilities permit, the mobilization of some units and the concentration of others will be carried on simultaneously. This separation of the two operations is the most expeditious way of reaching the final result, it means decentralization as long as the character of the work permits, that is, thorough mobilization. At the out-break of the Civil War, popular clamor and total lack of

preparation' on both sides made it necessary and possible to mix and even reverse these operations. In 1870, the pride of the French, following the prophesy of Von Moltke, forced them to begin operations before the reserves and complete equipment had reached the active army. The result was that the French Mobilization was never completed.

"To prevent the first troops that arrive at the place of concentration from being overwhelmed by the enemy, the concentration, whenever practicable, takes place behind some natural obstacle. If no such natural screen exists it is customary to organize an artificial one by the construction of fortified places, such' as the fortified curtains of France."

The actual concentration is a definite question of railroads and of preliminary preparation at the place of concentration.

In his "Franco-German War," Field Marshal Von Moltke says, "The means of mobilizing the North German Army had been reviewed year by year in view of any changes in the military or political situation, by the staff, in conjunction with the Minister of War. Every branch of the administration throughout the country had been kept informed of all it ought to know of these matters. * * * it was decided that the best way of protecting South Germany would be by an incursion into Alsace across the central part of the Rhine, which could be made by assembling the main force at that point. * * * as soon as this was decided the other preparations were made. The orders for marching or traveling by rail or boat, were worked out for each unit of 'the army, together with the most minute directions as to the different starting points, day and hour of departure, duration of journey, refreshment at stations, and place of destination. At the point of concentration, stores and magazines were established and thus when war was declared it needed only the royal signature to set the entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed precision."

Notwithstanding this apparently perfect preparation, some troops were for a time without rations, while rations were blocked and spoiling. The concentration was begun on the ninth day of mobilization, or July 24th, on the nineteenth day, or August 3rd, the whole army, 440,000 men and material, was concentrated. Nine railroad lines were used, three for the South and six for the North German Armies, they were given up entirely to the movement of the armies. The average haul during concentration was about 250 miles.

The fact that the German Government controls many of the railroads simplifies somewhat the perfection of the plans in peace, but it is not too much to say that, if the railroad authorities of this country are given sufficient warning they can accomplish results, as to numbers, distance and time that will equal if not surpass those possible in any other country. To get a general idea of possibilities let us assume fifty trains per day over a single track, forty men per car, and ten cars per train ; or 20,000 men per day over one track. This would mean for Albany 120,000 men per day, for Savannah 100,000 men per day, for San Antonio 80,000 men per day. Allowing half for supplies and material and counting six days as the longest haul, gives 360,000 men at Albany in six days. These in addition to the Regular Army, which should have reached the place of concentration before the auxiliary troops had finished their mobilization. The above is given as a rough approximation, sufficient total rolling stock being assumed. Data is not at hand for an accurate estimate which would consider facilities for entraining and detraining, sidings, rolling stock and perhaps special methods of moving trains for short distances very near the place of concentration.

All these questions as well as those of time-tables, subsistence, en route, the exact relation between the railroad and the military authorities, etc., must be worked out to the minutest essential detail. The actual organization and methods by which, the necessary data is to be obtained and

the preliminary arrangements made is a question for our General Staff. One section of the German General Staff is given entirely to such duties. In the new British, system "concentration" is under a section of the General Staff, "Mobilization" is under the Adjutant General and "railroad transportation" is under the Quartermaster General who is the head of a section of the General Staff. That this work cannot be handled as a side issue is very plain. The chief cause for confusion in the execution of concentration will be the lack of a central head. Efficient co-operation of all the roads could very probably be secured by standing contracts.

During July and up to September 16th, 1899, the British had embarked seven companies of the Army Service Corps for South Africa. The first expedition began embarking October 17th. This foresight is one of the few things that has received commendation from all critics, official and otherwise. In our service the necessary preparations at the place of concentration would require that the engineer troops with their equipment and the officers of each department requiring store houses, should be at the place of concentration several days before any other troops arrive, They should not only be there, but should have had such notice of what will be required as to have enabled them to make standing contracts, arrange to secure laborers, and be ready to complete in good time the essential preparations for storing materials and for furnishing the troops with rations, fuel and water.

The plan of strategic concentration is the project drawn up in time of peace to govern the general character of the operations at the outbreak of the war. While the execution of concentration must follow that of mobilization, this plan is the basis of mobilization and, in fact, of the general military policy.

You are referred to the plan made by Field Marshal Von Moltke in 1868-69 on the supposition of war between the North German confederation and the allied powers of France,

Austria and possibly Denmark. The arguments were so conclusive as to force the approval and co-operation of the Civil Authorities. In 1870, when France alone, and with less than her estimated strength and preparation, was to be met the execution of the plan, but slightly altered, left no room for doubt as to the final issue. The general opinion is that the German problem is less complicated than is our' own. It is readily seen that the scope of this question and the lack of definite data forbid any more than a mere enumeration of some of the considerations involved. The making of such plans is among the duties of our General Staff and their execution is the aim of all our military forces. The first question that arises is that of the probable enemy, then for each of the probable enemies the plan determines, whether the war shall be offensive or defensive ; the territory which is to be made the seat of war ; the place of concentration.

So long as self-existence is the prime reason for national government, any nation must assume that any other nation may become an enemy. The most probable enemies are those nations that are adjacent or whose general interests conflict. Our national opinion is that the integrity of America is essential to our welfare. These considerations make any other state of America or any foreign state with great present or prospective interests in America, our probable enemies. The pay we draw and all other money spent on military matters represents the national belief in that probability. The people do not ignore the farewell advice of Washington, but insure against that probability by some degree of preparation for war.

Whether to take the offensive or defensive depends upon many factors, which are usually enumerated as the National policy, relative military strength and reserves and relative preparation for mobilization and concentration and geography-to these may be added, in this country, the newspapers.

During peace, our people believe in the defensive, when war begins they demand the offensive.

The selection of the theatre of war depends mainly on politics and geography, and the location of the place of concentration naturally follows. The thorough study of all the above factors as applied to our nation is the work of years and should determine not only several places of concentration, but the forces, both regular and auxiliary, and the degree of preparation that would be required to meet any probable condition. When 'the military authorities reach these definite conclusions, and support them with facts and arguments sufficient to convince Congress and the people, our intermediate military problems will change from hazy assumption to fixed realities on which we can build up our military strength.

HARLEY B. FERGUSON,

Captain Corps of Engineers.

Dec. 9, 1904.

REFERENCES :

ARMED STRENGTH OF FRANCE East, 1877.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, Barbsteadt and Dwyer.

JOURNAL MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION.

JOURNAL ROYAL, UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

MEMOIRS, General Sherman.

MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION PUBLICATIONS, War Department.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION. Military Information Division translated by Major Eben Swift, U. S. A.

- MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, General Emery Upton, U. S. A. War Department.
- MY EXPERIENCES OF THE BOER WAR. Count Sternberg.
- PROPOSITION DE LOI. 1904: France:
RAILWAYS DURING WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Colonel Girouard.
- REGULATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION. (Provisional)
1904. British.
- REGULATIONS FOR RECRUITING REGULAR
ARMY, MILITIA AND IMPERIAL, YEOMANRY.
1903. British.
- REGULATIONS AND GENERAL ORDERS U. S.
ARMY.
- REPORT OF COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S.
ARMY. 1898.
- REPORT OF COMMISSION ON CONDUCT OF WAR
WITH SPAIN. War Department.
- REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON WAR IN
SOUTH AFRICA. British.
- STRATEGY. Text Book U. S. M. A. Colonel Fiebeger;
U. S. A.
- TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH
AFRICA. London.
- TWO MILLION CIVILIAN SOLDIERS OF THE
QUEEN, ETC. 1901. Bennet.
- VOLUNTARY VERSUS COMPULSORY SERVICE.
1897. Captain F. N. Maud, British.

RECRUITMENT, MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION.

QUESTION SHEET NO. 12.

Recruitment, mobilization and concentration. December 9, 1904.

1. What are the two general methods of recruiting?
2. By which method is the German army raised? The British ?
3. What general conditions determine the method of recruiting ?
4. What is the term of service in each class of the standing army of Germany?
5. What is the present law in France in regard to substitution? What is the term of service in the active army?
6. How are the Colonial armies of France and Germany raised.
7. What was the general rule of the British as to the appointment of officers over Volunteers in South Africa?
8. Describe the Swiss military system as to the following points : Liability to service, selection of officers, schools, target practice.
9. State the methods of appointing and promoting officers, and of raising and recruiting the U. S. forces in the Civil War.
10. What are the two prime factors in the total efficiency of a military force?
 - 1 I. What is mobilization ?
12. Give in general the German system of mobilization.
13. State previous preparation and approximate results in the case of the British mobilization for South Africa.

14. Describe the raising of the U. S. forces for the war with Spain.

15. What do the plans of mobilization determine?

16. Of what do the military forces of the United States consist?

17. What are the limitations of a plan of mobilization involving our Militia under the present law?

18. Who would make the detail plans in our service?

19. Explain the difference between mobilization and concentration.

20. Compare results in German concentration in 1870 with possibilities in the United States.

21. What preparations should be made at the place of concentration? Who should make them in our service?

22. What is the strategic plan of concentration? Upon what does it depend? What does it determine?